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EDITORIAL
OUR OBSOLETE LEGAL ENGLISH

By

DAGOBERT

D.

RUNES,

Ph.D.

The lawyer rarely questions the language to which he has
fallen heir. He accepts the mishmash of Latin, Anglo-Saxon,
and other alien expressions without troubling to inquire whether
they aren't bound up with dead customs, outmoded beliefs,
myths and superstitions which reach back to Roman or even to
primitive times. The lawyer seeks, often, to circumvent the
language of the law, because instinctively-if not consciouslyhe knows that the legal verbiage he employs refers to customs
and ideas long since dead. From this subterfuge and circumvention has arisen the popular opinion of the lawyer, which was
expressed by Ben Jonson in his famous couplet for Justice
Randall:
God works wonders now and then,
Here lies a lawyer, an honest man.
Now because he does not challenge the ideas upon which
law is based, the lawyer is at a grave disadvantage: for in every
case he undertakes he must vindicate the law as it has come down
to him; he must buttress it by argument, witness, and evidence,
and defend it before the judge if he wishes to win his case. In
so doing he perpetuates the legal abracadabra which befuddles
and dazzles the layman, completely at the mercy of the trained
legal minds of lawyer and judge.
Why all those conditional clauses in bills of sale, set usually
in six-point type? Why is it necessary today in a deed of sale to
use such a string of synonyms as "grant, bargain, sell, convey,
and confirm"? Why those cagey provisions, detrimental to the
tenant, in standard leases? For whom are the traps set by the
legal word-mongering which leaves the normally intelligent citizen dumbfounded?
The profession of law, said Dean Swift, "forms a society of
men, bred up from their youth in the art of proving by words
multiplied for the purpose that white is black and black is
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white, according as they are paid." And Milton describes the
lawyers of his day as "grounding their purposes, not on the
prudent and heavenly contemplation of justice and equity, which
was never taught them, but on the promising and pleasing
thoughts of litigious terms, fat contentions and flowing fees."
The law wraps itself in solemn, mystical, and equivocal
phrases, which can be construed any way a headachy judge
pleases. The ordinary man thinks he knows the meaning of simple words, but to the legal mind such words as "and" and "or"
assume undreamed-of complexities. "And" has been held to
mean "or," and vice versa, and the misbegotten and/or only adds
to the general confusion. Lawyers and judges like to think of
themselves as members of a sacred caste, guarding the consecrated precedents that hark back to immemorial times. With
similar ferocity they guard the complicated phraseology of the
law. Concerning legal obscurity, an old law commentator wrote
in 1718: ". . . and an abundance more of such cobweb subtleties,
spun so very fine by the spiders of the law, that one would think
it done on purpose to let justice fall through."
Does any lawyer need to be reminded that the learned Sir
William Blackstone, the mentor and patron saint of every
English and American lawyer, allied himself with the witchburners of his time in furnishing testimony to the existence of
witches? The father of "BMackstone's Commentaries" wrote:
"To deny the possibility, nay, actual existence of witchcraft and
sorcery is at once flatly to contradict the revealed word of God
in various passages of both the Old and New Testament, and
the thing itself is a truth to which every nation in the world
hath in its turn borne testimony, either by example seemingly
well tested, or by prohibitory laws which at least suppose the
possibility of commerce with evil spirits."
Other professions change to meet the needs of new times
and new customs. But legal English and legal procedure, in
which quiddity of speech plays so large a part, is the impregnable
fortress that blunts all the attacks of progress. Legal English
is no more sacred than other forms of speech. These show the
impress of the times. Why should legal English remain sacrosanct? Why should it be encrusted with meaningless verbiage
and cumbrous forms? Is it because, as the philologists tell us,
the word "law" is derived from the old Teutonic root liegen,
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meaning to lie? The law is something, in other words, which lies
fixed and prone, it doesn't move, doesn't change. Perhaps, who
knows, the body is lifeless, smothered in its impressive wrappings.
However, if we accept the less favorable meaning of "lie"
and of "liegen" we strike the most vulnerable spot in the lawyer's armor. Sophistry is the essence of legal speech and writing. Legal language is not functional, as some lawyers claim.
The most functional will ever written is that of Chief Justice
Holmes-one brief sentence. Of another famous American
jurist it was written: "As light and spongy fabrics are reduced
to a portable size by hydraulic pressure, so the verbose readings
of the law were, bythe force of his great mind, reduced to clear,
practical rules."
Toward the end of his life a British judge apologized for
having turned out so many heavy volumes of reports. Seeing
them piling up around him, he suggested a decennial auto-dar-fe
of all law reports-just set fire to the whole mass and start over
again.
Legal Latin may be termed the lawyer's sleight-of-hand by
which he hypnotizes the client. What is the fount of this sacerdotal speech? What is the clue to its stubborn persistence? At
one time the priest interceded with the god-in mumbo-jumnbo;
at one time the lawyer was hired by the manor lord to hornswoggle the husbandman who owned a valuable piece of property or a
buxom wife or a comely daughter. Hence the lex primis noctis
and the jus in rem.
A good deal of the prolixity in the English law goes back to
the time when Anglo-Saxon speech was in its infancy and
meanings were not yet crystallized. Today the language has
been sharpened and refined. It is a masterful instrument. If it
was good enough for Shakespeare, Addison, Swift, Macaulay,
Arnold, and Mill, it should be good enough for our lawyers and
judges. It was good enough for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
whose opinions are models of lucidness and brevity.
What, then, can be done to streamline legal English? The
plague of legal locution leads to such excesses as the recent Senate
and House Farm Bill which covers 179 printed pages and which
practically nobody has had time to read. Verbal debauches
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like this, suggest that the whole lawyer-made set-up is in its
dotage, ready for a pyre.
Veblen attributed this hangover to the respectable status of
archaism and waste. "'Where a conventional usage rests on the
canons of archaism and waste," he said, "the spokesmen for the
usage instinctively take an apologetic attitude. It is contended
in substance that a punctilious use of ancient and accredited
locutions will serve to convey thought more adequately than
would a straightforward use of the latest form of spoken English. . . . They are reputable because they are cumbrous and outof-date."
Is it not time that we exploded the theory that anything
which is gnarled and ancient is of necessity right ? The horrors
of legal verbiage, Better Englisb suggests, must go!
Reprinted from March issue of Better English Magazine.

